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Abstract 
Using data from a new question in the 2011 UK census, national identities across 
minority ethno-religious groups in England, Wales and Scotland are compared. 
The findings substantiate earlier work showing high levels of British 
identification among minority groups, but also demonstrate that this does not 
extend to sub-state national identities. The extent of sub-state national 
identification varies between different minorities, but the nature of this variation 
also depends on the specific (sub-state) national context. The findings may be 
understood in relation to key biographical ‘markers’ of national identity. These 
markers help explain variations in sub-state national identities to a much greater 
extent than British identity, but their effect also varies across the different 
nations. The analysis demonstrates the importance of examining sub-state as 
well as state (British) identities, and heeding differences in the ways in which 
these identities might be conceived and asserted across national borders within 
the same state. 
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Sub-state national identities among minority groups in Britain: a 
comparative analysis of 2011 Census data 
The 2011 UK population censuses in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland included for the first time a question on national identity. While many 
social and political surveys in the UK have included questions about national 
identity, these typically include only small numbers of people in minority ethnic 
and religious groups living outside England. Data from the 2011 census therefore 
offer an unprecedented opportunity to rigorously compare the national 
identities of those belonging to various minority groups in different parts of the 
UK. Previous UK quantitative research has also predominantly addressed 
identification as British rather than sub-state (English, Welsh, Scottish) national 
identities among ethnic and religious minorities. This is surprising given the 
prevalence of these identities among the wider population. As well as expanding 
the scope of investigation to include England, Scotland and Wales, this paper also 
aims to address this deficit by comparing sub-state national identification among 
minority groups in these different parts of the UK. Relevant previous research – 
both quantitative and qualitative – is discussed before the data and analysis are 
explained and presented. 
 
National identities, minorities and the UK Censuses  
Jenkins argues that individual and collective identities are constituted via a 
process that he terms ‘the internal-external dialectic of identification’ (2014: 42-
3). More specifically, we may understand national identities in a similar manner: 
they are both self-conceived and externally-influenced (Bond 2006). Individuals 
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have agency over their own identities but this is limited by the personal markers 
on which they may base a claim to a national identity (Kiely et al, 2001); their 
perception of the nature of that identity and whether or not they can (or want to) 
include themselves in it; and their anticipation of whether or not others would 
be likely to include them. While markers of national identity such as physical 
appearance, socialization, accent, or dress might be significant (see e.g. Kiely et al 
2001; Virdee et al 2006), previous research suggests that three particular 
biographical markers – birthplace, ancestry and residence (‘birth, blood and 
belonging’) – are fundamental (Kiely et al 2001, 2005; McCrone et al 1998). 
Therefore, compared to those in the national majority, for people who lack one 
or more of these markers in a particular national context (such as those in 
minority ethnic or national groups) claiming a national identity is likely to be 
more problematic.  
These are key issues to bear in mind when examining statistical data on people’s 
national identities. Although a question on subjective national identity was 
introduced to the UK census for the first time in 2011, some UK surveys based on 
population samples have consistently included questions on national identity, 
and some research based on these sources has more specifically addressed the 
national identities of those in minority groups. Karlsen and Nazroo (2015) used 
Citizenship Survey data for England and Wales to explore associations between 
minority ethnicity and belonging to Britain, with a particular focus on Muslims. 
Their findings demonstrate high levels of belonging to Britain among minority 
ethno-religious groups generally and, contrary to much political rhetoric, show 
that if anything Muslims feel they belong to Britain more strongly than other 
minorities. They also show that birthplace and perceived levels of institutional 
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discrimination against minorities also influence national belonging. Earlier 
analysis of Citizenship Survey data (Maxwell 2006) similarly shows that 
Muslims, and indeed other prominent non-Christian groups mainly originating 
from South Asia, exhibit relatively strong levels of British identification, and that 
perceived discrimination may have a negative effect upon this identification. 
Both Platt (2014) and Heath and Demireva (2014) employ data from the 2010 
Ethnic Minority British Election Survey, with Platt primarily and Heath and 
Demireva partly addressing the issue of British identification among minority 
ethno-religious groups. They also find that levels of British identification are 
high, especially among individuals born in Britain, and that Muslim groups are 
comparatively likely to identify as British. Similarly to Maxwell (2006), they also 
show that even those not born in Britain often show a strong affinity to the 
country, especially those who have lived there for a considerable period of time.  
But this survey-based research shares a particular focus on national 
identification at the state level of Britishness, rather than the sub-state level. It 
addresses whether people in minority ethnic and religious groups feel they 
belong to Britain and/or identify as British, but not whether they identify as, for 
example, English. Moreover, the multinational nature of the UK is not only rather 
neglected in this respect, but also in a comparative sense. Data are not 
differentiated by sub-state national territories, and thus do not show how British 
or sub-state (English, Welsh, Scottish) identification among minority groups 
might vary across these territories.  
An important exception is Nandi and Platt’s (2015) work, which uses data from 
the Understanding Society survey to assess and compare state and sub-state 
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national identification among minority groups in the UK. They again establish 
that levels of British identification among minorities (most obviously, but not 
exclusively, those born in Britain) compare well with the White majority, among 
whom exclusive sub-state national identification (e.g. as English) is more 
common. However, while they conclude that ‘country-level [i.e. sub-state] 
identities … can be considered more ethnic than civic national identities’ (2015: 
2630), whether this applies across the different national territories of the UK is 
uncertain since the data are not differentiated on that basis. It is also unclear 
whether the number of cases is sufficiently large in each UK nation to support 
comparative analysis across these nations.  
The absence of such comparative analysis is significant considering other 
research evidence on sub-state national identification among minority groups in 
different parts of Britain. The relatively small number of relevant quantitative 
studies have indicated a reluctance among people in minority ethnic and 
religious groups in England to identify as English as opposed to British (Bond 
2011; Curtice and Heath 2000). Qualitative research, for example among young 
Muslims in the north of England, similarly demonstrates high levels of British 
identification and more negative attitudes towards Englishness (Thomas and 
Sanderson 2011). Qualitative research which predominantly focuses on the 
White majority in England (Leddy-Owen 2013, 2014) also suggests that while 
the White majority may not explicitly associate Englishness with whiteness, 
there is an implicit ethnicizing of English identity that does not apply to 
Britishness: skin colour and ancestry are important markers of English national 
identity. Fenton and Mann (2011: 226-7) similarly conclude that ‘… with respect 
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to the distinction between Englishness and Britishness, whiteness appears 
important’.  
However, not all qualitative research in England has arrived at similar 
conclusions. While some have associated English and British identities with 
ethnic and civic national ideal types respectively (Leddy-Owen 2013), Condor 
and her colleagues (Condor et al 2006) argue that this is overly simplistic 
because Englishness and Britishness will be understood and employed 
contextually in ways that represent both these ideal types. Whether non-
identification as English among ethnic minorities should be understood as a form 
of exclusion and if so what might be the consequences of such exclusion has also 
been debated. Condor et al (2006: 140) argue that reluctance to identify as 
English among minorities should not be interpreted as a sense of ‘exclusion’, but 
an ‘autonomous ethnic preference’. A related argument proposes that if 
Englishness is understood not as a national identity but as an ethnic identity 
existing under the broader umbrella of a civic Britishness that includes all ethnic 
groups, then the association of Englishness with whiteness is not necessarily 
problematic (Fenton and Mann 2011; Leddy-Owen 2014; Mann 2011). Condor et 
al (2006: 152-3) and Fenton (2011: 15) also caution against the conflation of 
‘symbolic’ exclusion associated with national identities and social exclusion, with 
its attendant material consequences.  
Against this, we might argue that even purely ‘symbolic’ exclusion is negative in 
that it effectively curtails individuals’ autonomy to identify with national 
collectivities to which they should feel they have a right to belong on the basis of, 
e.g. birthplace and residence: ‘… large numbers of the English population who 
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identify – or wish to identify – as English feel actively excluded from the category 
because they are not white’ (Leddy-Owen 2014: 1464). Further, to observe that 
symbolic and social exclusion are not coterminous does not necessarily imply 
that symbolic exclusion is not consequential for social exclusion. Leddy-Owen, 
for example, argues that the predominant construction of Englishness as 
‘normatively white’ suggest it is a ‘kind of exclusionary, fixed racialised identity 
[that] has a clear potential for social exclusion and social harm’ (2013: 5.1). This 
would seem to be supported by the negative association between national 
identification and perceptions of discrimination among people in minority 
groups (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006). Finally, even if we broadly 
accept that ‘rather than ‘housing diversity’, the category English is treated as one 
of the many other ethnicities within a multiethnic national space’ (Mann 2011: 
125), this leaves some sociological puzzles.  
First, why should Britishness be privileged as ‘the’ national space within which 
Englishness is accommodated as one of many ethnic identities if, as we shall see, 
when asked to state their national identity, many people in England favour 
Englishness rather than Britishness? Second, why, within some other UK 
territories, might sub-state national identities seem better equipped to ‘house 
diversity’ and include (non-White) minorities? Evidence from Wales is rather 
scarce in this regard. Notwithstanding political initiatives to promote an 
inclusive Welsh national identity (Chaney and Fevre 2001; Evans et al 2015) 
some argue that the importance of language and culture to Welsh identity makes 
it more difficult for ethnic minorities to identify as Welsh (Scourfield and Davies 
2005; Williams 1999). But a substantial body of qualitative research in Scotland 
(Bonino 2015; Hopkins 2004, 2007, 2008; Kyriakides et al 2009; Saeed et al 
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1999; Virdee et al 2006) and the limited quantitative work that has addressed 
the national identities of minorities there (Hussain and Miller 2006; Rosie and 
Hepburn 2015) suggests that Scottishness may be relatively inclusive of those in 
minority ethnic and religious groups.  
Evidence from Scotland thus suggests that Britishness is not the only potentially 
ethnically-inclusive national identity in the UK, even though the majority of 
relevant research focuses solely on British identification among minorities. 
However, many of the claims regarding national identification among people in 
minority groups in Scotland are also based on somewhat limited evidence, 
mainly focused on small-scale qualitative research in specific places and/or with 
specific minority groups, or rare quantitative research with low sample sizes 
and/or addressing particular groups. The 2011 census data offer a broader and 
more reliable basis for the analysis of national identities among minority groups 
across the population of Scotland as a whole, and for comparison with similar 
groups in other parts of Britain. 
Just as Renan (1994) [1882] described the nation as a ‘daily plebiscite’, Kertzer 
and Arel (2002: 20) propose that ‘since identity is subjective and contingent 
upon social and political factors, one wonders whether it would not be more 
fruitful to view the census – or, at least, the identity questions of the census – as a 
type of plebiscite’. Unlike Renan’s formulation, the UK national census is a rare 
rather than daily event, usually taking place every ten years. UK Census 
questions therefore inevitably evolve slowly, and part of this evolution in recent 
decades has concerned the introduction of the kind of questions to which Kertzer 
and Arel refer: those concerning subjective (ethnic, religious, national) identities. 
 9 
Such questions were largely absent from the UK censuses until the late twentieth 
century1. A question on ethnicity was first introduced in the 1991 census and 
this was followed by the inclusion of a question on religion in all parts of the UK 
for the first time in 20012, and the new national identity question in 2011. 
Material related to the perceived need for, and development of, this question 
suggests that its primary aim was to improve people’s capacity to record their 
ethnonational identification (Office for National Statistics 2009; Scottish 
Government and General Register Office for Scotland 2008). 
Because the census attempts to represent the whole population, it avoids the 
problem of investigating national identities among ethnic and religious 
minorities which form only a very small part of the population and are thus very 
weakly represented in sample surveys, especially in UK territories outside 
England. Census data thus allows us to address a number of relatively neglected 
questions. How do sub-state (English, Welsh, Scottish) national identities among 
minority groups within each nation compare with the British identification that 
has been the focus of most previous research in this area? To what extent do 
census data support previous (mainly qualitative) research, for example in 
showing that whiteness is central to Englishness and/or that Scottish identity is 
inclusive of those in ethnic and religious minorities? How do patterns of national 
identities across specific minority groups compare between different UK nations, 
and what might be the key factors underlying these identities?  
 
Outline of data and methods 
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Although national identities may be investigated to some extent using published 
aggregate census data, these have limitations. Generally, aggregate data do not 
allow further manipulation (e.g. to select specific cases or create new variables) 
or more complex multivariate statistical analysis. More specifically regarding 
analysis of national identities, the census records these identities for each 
member of the population, regardless of age. It therefore seems inevitable that 
for many non-adults the data will not reflect an individual’s own subjective 
identification but rather a category assigned or influenced by a parent or 
guardian. Applying a suitable age threshold for the legitimate expression of 
subjective identities is difficult and available guidance varies (see e.g. 
Parameshwaran and Engzell 2015), but it certainly seems important to 
distinguish between data on national identity that is likely to be autonomously 
derived and that which is more likely to be ‘proxy’ in nature. Published aggregate 
data do not allow for this. 
Analysis therefore used microdata: a random 5 per cent sample of census 
returns, published separately for England and Wales and Scotland via the UK 
Data Service by the Office for National Statistics (2014) and the National Records 
of Scotland (2015). To address ‘proxy’ national identities, only cases aged sixteen 
and over were included, yielding total adult sample sizes of 2,185,090 in 
England, 127,081 in Wales and 220,865 in Scotland. To exemplify the scale of 
these samples relative to those found in even the largest sample surveys, we may 
compare the UK Annual Population Survey (APS), which aggregates Labour 
Force Survey data and also includes a question on national identity. The most 
recently available APS at the time of writing (April 2014-March 2015), even 
though having an extremely large number of cases by the standard of sample 
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surveys, still has only 33,875 adult cases in Scotland and 29,345 in Wales. This 
has very substantial implications for the number of cases in minority groups. For 
example, even among some of the larger ethnic groups, in Scotland the census 
microdata contains nearly 1,500 adult Chinese cases, compared to only 60 in the 
APS; or in Wales there are 375 adult Pakistanis in the census microdata 
compared to 52 in the APS. Such differences have a huge impact on the reliability 
of multivariate analysis of data pertaining to minority groups, especially in Wales 
and Scotland. Northern Ireland was not included in the analysis, principally 
because total numbers in minority groups are much smaller even than in 
Scotland and Wales, and the Northern Ireland census microdata only 
distinguishes between White and Other ethnic groups.  
Although the census ostensibly covers the whole population, some consideration 
should also be given to response rate. The ONS target in England and Wales, for 
example, was not 100 per cent but 94 per cent, which was achieved (Office for 
National Statistics 2012: 2). This response rate compares very favourably even 
with major public surveys: to take just one example of a survey that has been 
used to analyse national identities, in the first wave of Understanding Society 
(2009-10) household response rate was 57 per cent among the general 
population sample and 40 per cent for the ethnic minority boost sample 
(National Centre for Social Research 2012: 36). The census response also 
represents a proportion of the entire population rather than just a small sample 
of it, and although response was somewhat lower among some minority ethnic 
groups, rates among the largest of these (Indians and Pakistanis) were close to 
94 per cent and for most other minority groups they exceeded 80 per cent 
(Office for National Statistics 2012: 6). Since these rates are considerably higher 
 12 
than those typically achieved in sample surveys, and because they represent 
proportions of the whole population, we can have a relatively high degree of 
confidence in the extent to which they are representative of majority and 
minority populations. This can also be said of the microdata, which is based on a 
stratified random sample, designed to be proportionately representative of the 
population3.  
The key dependent variables were based on the single census question on 
national identity. It should be noted that the wording of this question was similar 
but subtly different in Scotland (‘What do you feel is your national identity?’) 
compared to England and Wales (‘How would you describe your national 
identity?’). Response options were also similar but varied according to national 
territory. English was the first option offered in England, Welsh in Wales and 
Scottish in Scotland, and British was the final explicit option in each. An ‘Other’ 
option to write in a different (or additional) national identity was also offered. 
Although the instructions explicitly encouraged participants to select more than 
one option if appropriate, in each nation a large majority chose one national 
identity only. Simple binary dependent variables are therefore used for each 
national identity to indicate whether people recorded that identity or not.  
In selecting the explanatory variables, it is clearly important that ethnicity and 
religion are included given the paper’s key focus on national identities among 
(ethnic and religious) minorities. These variables are also indicators of ancestry, 
which, as discussed above is one of the key biographical markers of national 
identity. Rather than including these variables separately, combined ethno-
religious groups are used. This allows us to reflect the religious diversity within 
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some minority ethnic groups while also taking into account the homogeneity of 
others (see e.g. Heath and Demireva 2014; Nandi and Platt 2015). For example, 
since the vast majority of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK are Muslim, for 
these groups adding religion separately adds little to the analysis. This approach 
also allows comparison with other recent UK research on national identification 
among minority groups, which has also used a combined ethno-religious 
explanatory variable (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 
2014). The other principal markers of national identity – birthplace and 
residence – were also included as a composite explanatory variable using the 
questions on country of birth and (for migrants from outside the UK) year of 
most recent UK arrival, from which approximate period of residence was 
derived. The inclusion of birthplace is also clearly important given that, as noted 
above, its significance has been highlighted by previous quantitative analysis of 
national identities in the UK (Heath and Demireva 2014; Karlsen and Nazroo 
2015; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014). Similarly, previous research on British 
(Platt 2014) and Scottish national identities (Bond 2006) has indicated that for 
migrants, period of residence influences degree of identification. 
Since the Welsh language is an important element of Welsh national identity 
which, it has been argued, might differentially exclude those from minority 
ethnic backgrounds (Williams 1999: 86-7), for Wales self-perceived proficiency 
in Welsh was included as an explanatory variable, using a composite variable 
based on questions regarding ability to understand, read, speak and/or write the 
language. Although not widely spoken in Scotland, Scottish Gaelic is unique to 
the nation, as is the more commonly used (albeit less clearly defined) Scots 
language. Considering this, and the wider centrality of language to national 
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identity (see e.g. Brubaker 2013: 3; Miller 1995: 23, 33) a similar approach was 
taken in Scotland, using data from questions on Gaelic and Scots languages. That 
proficiency in English might be related to English national identity was also 
considered, but since the census in England only assessed this for people whose 
main language was not English, including this variable would have excluded 
large numbers of people in minority groups. Preliminary analysis also showed no 
positive correlation between proficiency in English and identification as English. 
Some broader demographic and socioeconomic variables were taken into 
account. (Occupational) social class was included as an explanatory variable 
because previous research (Maxwell 2006; Nandi and Platt 2015) has observed 
that socio-economic status may be associated with degree of national 
identification. Finally, age was included because other work on national 
identities among minorities has found that this may be a significant variable 
(Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006) or should be controlled for since the 
age distributions of minority populations born in the UK and overseas differ 
(Platt 2014: 52-3). Some UK research on national identities among the 
population more generally has also found age-related variations in British and 
sub-state national identities (see e.g. Heath et al 1999). 
 
Comparing British and sub-state identities  
Before presenting more complex models which control for the effects of the 
other key explanatory variables outlined above, Table 1 simply shows how both 
British and sub-state identities vary across the different ethno-religious groups 
in the three nations. The White British etc. group also includes those who 
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identify as White English, Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish. The remaining 
groups reflect the most substantial ethno-religious minorities and only a very 
small proportion of cases have been excluded, most prominently those in 
unspecified ‘Other’ ethnic groups. As far as possible, the same groups have also 
been used in each nation in order to facilitate comparison. This has entailed 
combining some (similar) sub-groups because of relatively low sub-sample sizes 
in Wales and Scotland. The Mixed group was undifferentiated in the Scottish data 
whereas figures for the different Mixed groups in England and Wales are shown 
separately, and in Scotland the African and Caribbean groups were not 
designated as Black.   
Table 1 here 
The table shows a number of similarities across all three nations with respect to 
both British and sub-state national identities. First, the White minorities are less 
likely than the White majority to see themselves as British or (more markedly) to 
record a sub-state national identity. Second, those in Mixed ethnic groups are 
more likely than the White majority to see themselves as British but much less 
likely to identify with the sub-state nation, with the exception of those Mixed 
groups in Wales which do not differ significantly from the majority. Total levels 
of British and sub-state national identification for all Mixed groups combined are 
also quite similar in the three nations. Third, those in non-White groups are 
particularly unlikely to identify as English, Welsh or Scottish compared to the 
White majority. 
There are however some notable contrasts across the three nations. First, 
compared to England and Scotland, sub-state national identities among the 
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White majority are considerably less common in Wales. This largely relates to 
the 23 per cent of adults living in Wales who were born in England: 88 per cent 
of those in the White British etc. group in Wales who were also born in Wales 
identify as Welsh, compared to only 11 per cent of people in this group who were 
born in England. Second, while there is clear variation in British identification 
between the various non-White minority groups in each nation, there is also 
variation across the nations. For most of these non-White groups, British 
identities are more common in Wales and (especially) in England than in 
Scotland. Third, while again there is evident variation in sub-state national 
identities between White and non-White minority groups within each nation, 
with only two (non-significant) exceptions people in these minority groups are 
clearly more likely (often markedly so) to identify as Scottish than to see 
themselves as English or Welsh.  
Overall then, these data suggest that even though much work on national 
identity in the UK focuses on Britishness, in fact among the White majority sub-
state national identities might be much more prominent. The relative proclivity 
of people in (especially non-White) minority groups to identify as British, as 
highlighted in previous research, is confirmed. Studies which have indicated the 
apparent ‘ethnicization’ of Englishness are also substantiated, and it seems that 
this can also be extended to Welsh identity. Clearly, ancestry is important for 
sub-state national identification in England and Wales but much less so for 
Britishness. While the evidence also tends to support work which has suggested 
that Scottish identity may be relatively inclusive of those in minority groups, 
some caution is certainly required here. People in minority groups are still much 
less likely to see themselves as Scottish than are the White majority; in none of 
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these groups (with the marginal exception of those with Mixed ethnicity) do a 
majority identify as Scottish; and in some groups only a small minority do so. 
Identification as British is also more common than Scottish identity in most non-
White minority groups.  
 
Further exploring sub-state national identities  
Tables 2-4 present binary logistic regression models which, as well as ethno-
religious group, also include the other explanatory variables outlined above. This 
allows us to assess the extent to which variation in identities between different 
groups shown in Table 1 might be related to other key markers of national 
identity such as birthplace, and to investigate how these other variables might 
themselves be associated with national identification.  
Because most previous relevant quantitative research has addressed British 
identification (and data shown in Table 1 seem to confirm the findings of that 
research), only sub-state national identities are modelled as dependent 
variables. Binary logistic regression is appropriate because these dependent 
variables simply reflect, respectively, whether or not English (Table 2), Welsh 
(Table 3) or Scottish (Table 4) national identity was chosen. All explanatory 
variables with the exception of age are categorical, and the reference category 
for each is shown in brackets. For these variables the number of respondents in 
each sub-category is also shown to highlight any potential issues with low sub-
sample sizes. Odds ratios are shown to indicate variation in national identities 
across categories. The further these ratios deviate from 1, the greater the 
difference in levels of identification between that category and the reference 
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category. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that people in that category are 
more likely to identify as English etc. compared to people in the reference 
category for that variable, and odds ratios less than 1 show the reverse. For the 
age variable the odds ratios show the effects of a one unit increase in age, 
controlling for the other explanatory variables: e.g. an odds ratio greater than 1 
shows that older people are more likely to identify as English. The 95 per cent 
confidence intervals are also shown for each odds ratio. Where these do not 
overlap with 1, this indicates that differences are statistically significant at a level 
of p < 0.05. The breadth of the confidence intervals also reflects the number of 
cases in each sub-category. 
The R2 values for the models may be interpreted as indicating the extent to 
which the explanatory variables collectively account for variation in 
identification as English, Welsh or Scottish. These may range potentially from 0 
to 1, with values closer to 0 indicating weaker explanatory value. In addition, 
explanatory variables were entered in steps, beginning with ethno-religious 
group, followed by birth/residence, age, social class, and finally (for Wales and 
Scotland only) language proficiency. In doing this the increase in R2 at each step 
indicates the extent to which the addition of the relevant variable(s) adds to the 
explanation of variation in national identities.  
Tables 2-4 here 
Once more there are a number of broad similarities in the findings across the 
three nations, but also some subtle and important differences. The R2 values 
indicate that together the explanatory variables account for a considerable 
amount of the variation in sub-state national identities in each nation4. Even 
 19 
when we control for the effects of all explanatory variables, the general finding 
shown in Table 1 is sustained: compared to the White majority, people in 
(virtually) all minority groups across all three nations are considerably less 
likely to record a sub-state national identity. This difference is least marked 
among the Mixed groups, and indeed in Wales we can observe the only two 
examples of minority groups that are not significantly less likely to have a sub-
state national identity than the White majority: the Mixed White/Black 
Caribbean and White/Black African groups. In both Wales and England among all 
minorities the Mixed White/Black Caribbean group also shows the highest levels 
of Welsh or English identification relative to the White majority. But even 
beyond the Mixed groups, the odds ratios in all three nations show substantial 
variation in identities between the various minority groups. Hence, even when 
accounting for other key differences in, e.g. birthplace and period of UK 
residence, the specific nature of ethno-religious background (and thus ancestry) 
among people in minority groups is significant for national identification. 
The effects of country of birth and period of UK residence are themselves 
broadly consistent across the nations. The centrality of birthplace is evident: 
those who were born in one UK nation and now live in another are very unlikely 
to claim the national identity of that territory compared to those who were born 
there. This is also clearly true of migrants from outside the UK. Length of 
residence is not insignificant – generally speaking, longer-term UK residents are 
more likely to see themselves as English, Welsh or Scottish compared to more 
recently arrived migrants – but compared to those born in Scotland, England or 
Wales, all migrants are very unlikely to identify with the sub-state nation.  
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Social class also has a significant and broadly similar effect in all three nations, 
albeit less marked than the other variables discussed thus far: adding social class 
to the models in each nation increases the value of R2 only very marginally 
compared to ethno-religious group and the birth/residence variable (see below). 
Compared to those in higher managerial and professional groups, people in all 
other class categories are more likely to identify with the sub-state nation 
(although not significantly so for the lower managerial/professional group in 
Wales), and this is particularly true of those in more working-class categories.  
The effect of language in Wales and Scotland is consistent with what we might 
have anticipated. Any self-perceived proficiency in Welsh, Gaelic or Scots is 
positively associated with sub-state national identification, and for Welsh and 
Scots this effect is most marked among the most proficient. However, once more 
compared to the other key markers of national identity reflecting ancestry and 
birthplace, the increase in R2 is fairly marginal, suggesting that language 
proficiency does not help explain variations in national identity very much once 
other key explanatory variables are taken into account. 
But despite these overall consistencies, we may also identify at least four 
interesting differences between the nations. The first concerns the extent to 
which (especially non-Mixed) minority groups differ from the White majority in 
their degree of sub-state national identification. The data show that in England 
people in each of these groups are particularly unlikely to identify with the sub-
state nation. This is also reflected in the importance of the ethno-religious 
variable to the overall model for English identity relative to Welsh and Scottish 
identities. The value of R2 when this is entered as the sole explanatory variable in 
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England is 0.383, compared to 0.108 and 0.218 in Wales and Scotland 
respectively.  
In more detail, the relative reluctance of people in minority groups in England to 
identify with the sub-state national identity can perhaps be observed most 
clearly in a comparison with parallel groups in Scotland: for each (White and 
non-White) minority the odds ratio in Scotland is much higher than for its 
counterpart in England, and indeed even the highest odds ratio for any such 
group in England (Black Caribbean or Other Black: No religion) exceeds the odds 
ratio for only one in Scotland (Bangladeshi Muslim). A similar comparison with 
Wales also suggests that for nearly all minority groups the likelihood of sub-state 
national identification is higher than the parallel group in England, although for 
most it is also lower than Scotland. This also suggests that, to some extent at 
least, the relative inclusivity of Scottish identity holds across the various 
minority groups. 
A second interesting difference between nations lies in the nature of the 
variation in sub-state national identification between minority groups. For 
example, while Arab Muslims in Scotland and Indian or Other Asian Muslims in 
Wales show high levels of sub-state identification relative to other minorities, 
this is not the case in the other nations. Similarly, people in the Indian or Other 
Asian Sikh group are among the least likely to identify as English and Welsh but 
among the most likely to identify as Scottish. While sub-sample sizes of these 
groups outside England suggest some caution, these findings nevertheless 
indicate that specific sub-state contexts might be influential in understanding 
national identities among specific ethno-religious groups.  
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Thirdly, although the nature of the effects of birthplace and period of residence 
are similar across the three nations, there are some interesting differences in the 
degree of these effects. Birthplace is especially central to Welsh identity. Adding 
the birth/residence variable as the second step in the Wales model increases R2 
very markedly from 0.108 to 0.624 – easily the most substantial effect of adding 
any variable to any of the models. A more detailed examination of the odds ratios 
for Wales shows that even quite long-term UK residents who were not born in 
Wales are much less likely to record a sub-state national identity than similar 
migrants in England and Scotland. However, in Scotland birthplace also clearly 
makes the largest contribution to explaining variation in national identities. 
Adding the birth/residence variable increases R2 from 0.218 to 0.563, and more 
detailed examination of the odds ratios suggests that even very long-term 
residents who were not born in the UK are much less likely to identify as Scottish 
compared to those born in Scotland. Although, as we have seen, in England 
ethno-religious group makes the largest contribution to the R2 value, perhaps 
surprisingly, Englishness seems the most amenable to a process of assuming 
national identity based on residence rather than birth: in most categories of 
residence for migrants the odds ratios for England are higher than in parallel 
groups in Scotland.  
A final difference concerns the effects of age. In Scotland, older people are less 
likely to claim a sub-state national identity, but the opposite is true in England. 
However, it should be noted that in all three nations adding the age variable has 
only a very marginal effect on the R2 value once ethno-religious group, birthplace 
and period of residence have been taken into account, and indeed in Wales the 
effect of age is not statistically significant.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Nandi and Platt have observed that ‘Minorities are … largely signed up to the 
‘national story’ represented by British identity’ (2015: 2630, emphasis added), 
while also conceding that the extent to which the majority population identifies 
with the sub-state nations of Britain raises questions about the coherence of this 
‘story’. While some quantitative research has addressed British identification 
among UK minorities, the comparative neglect of sub-state national identities 
and the alternative ‘narrative’ they might represent for minorities (Whittaker 
2015: 390; Williams 2015: 332) is significant given the prominence of these 
identities in the wider population. Particularly in Wales and Scotland, a key 
reason for this has been the absence of adequate data, which is why the 
introduction of a census question on national identity has been such a significant 
development.  
By using the data arising from this question, this paper has built on previous 
research while adding substantial new insights. The findings substantiate earlier 
work (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014) in showing 
that many minority groups exhibit high levels of British identification, but also 
demonstrate that this does not extend to sub-state identification. The analysis 
also showed that the heterogeneity evident in British identification between 
different minority groups largely located in England (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; 
Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014) is also evident for sub-state identities among 
minorities across Britain, and that the nature of this heterogeneity also depends 
to some extent on the specific (sub-state) national context. 
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The findings may be understood in relation to the key biographical ‘markers’ 
(Kiely et al, 2001) of national identity outlined earlier. Significantly, it is clear 
that these markers help us explain variations in sub-state national identities to a 
much greater extent than British identity, but, equally significantly, the effect of 
these markers varies across the different nations, showing the value of the 
unprecedented comparative analysis that has been presented. If ethno-religious 
group is taken to be an indicator of ancestry, then particularly in England this 
marker appears central to sub-state (English) national identity. This suggests the 
findings of qualitative research (e.g. Thomas and Sanderson 2011; Leddy-Owen 
2014) may be extended to the population of England more widely. But perhaps 
more surprisingly, period of residence may be a more important marker of 
English identity than the other sub-state national identities. Birthplace has 
previously been established as an important factor in British identification for 
minorities (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014) and, 
together with ethnicity, it also contributes most to understanding variation in 
sub-state national identities in all three nations. But the analysis also transcends 
previous research in showing that being born in Wales is especially central to 
Welsh identity. Similarly, while this paper confirms the findings of previous 
qualitative research (Kiely et al 2001, 2005) in showing the importance of 
birthplace for Scottish identity, it also highlights that although in some respects 
Scottish identity is relatively inclusive of minorities, this is not true to the extent 
that we might have expected from previous smaller scale research in Scotland.   
These findings are sustained even when we control for other factors that are 
likely to influence national identity, but the effects of these factors are 
themselves noteworthy. In all three nations those in more working class groups 
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were more likely to record a sub-state identity. While the analysis by no means 
suggests a widespread disassociation from Englishness among the middle-class, 
which was a key finding of Mann’s (2012) qualitative research, Mann’s findings 
do suggest some explanation for class variation in identities in England at least. 
While people in Wales and Scotland who have self-perceived proficiency in 
Welsh, Gaelic and/or Scots language were also more likely to assert a sub-state 
national identity, one might question the causal direction of this association. 
There is a subjective element in the self-evaluation of linguistic skills and it may 
be that those who feel more strongly Welsh or Scottish are more likely to assess 
positively their abilities in the respective national languages. Further, the 
analysis suggests that compared to the key markers of national identity, class 
and language add comparatively little to our capacity to explain variation in sub-
state national identities. This is also true of people’s age, which also had rather 
different associations with national identities in England and Scotland and no 
significant effect in Wales.  
The data on which this paper is based do have some limitations. First, 
quantitative questionnaire-based approaches to researching national identities 
do not have the capacity fully to reflect the complexity and contingency of how 
such identities are understood and expressed (Condor et al 2006; Karlsen and 
Nazroo 2015; Mann 2011; Platt 2014), and this point extends to the census as a 
more specific instrument. It is therefore important that quantitative studies such 
as this one continue to be complemented by more detailed qualitative work on 
particular groups and/or locales. Such research might also be more attuned to 
the ‘dialectical’ processes involved in national identification, which were 
discussed earlier.  
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Second, even compared to other sources of quantitative data on national identity 
the census has a narrower scope. Some sample surveys include several questions 
on national identity (see e.g. Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Nandi and Platt 2015; 
Platt 2014) and also commonly have a wider suite of variables that can add 
further dimensions to investigation of the reasons behind variation in national 
identities among people in minority groups, for example their perceptions and 
experiences of discrimination (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006; Nandi 
and Platt 2015; Platt 2014). However, it is also recognized (Bechhofer and 
McCrone 2007: 253) that large-scale quantitative approaches also make an 
important contribution to research on national identities, especially when the 
aim is to compare patterns of identities between and within general populations, 
for example in comparing different ethnic and religious groups (Karlsen and 
Nazroo 2015: 19). When the focus is on such minority sub-populations, then 
especially in those parts of the UK (outside England) where these minorities are 
inadequately represented in sample surveys, the 2011 census offers an 
unprecedented and uniquely robust resource. Further, the fact that it also now 
addresses other markers of national identity (birth, ancestry, residence, 
language) means that the analytic potential of the census to investigate national 
identities more generally does  not compare particularly unfavourably with 
other relevant surveys. 
While the underlying reasons for varying patterns of sub-state national 
identification among minorities should doubtless be pursued in further research, 
the novel analysis of minority groups facilitated by the new census data on 
national identities demonstrates the importance of examining sub-state as well 
as state (British) identities, and paying heed to differences in the ways in which 
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these identities might be conceived and asserted across national borders within 
the same state. 
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Notes 
1 Not one but three UK censuses actually take place (albeit on the same day and 
with similar questions): in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. 
2 Religion has been addressed in Northern Ireland since the first post-partition 
census in 1926. 
3 See 2011 Census Microdata Individual Safeguarded Samples – User Guide 
(http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7605/mrdoc/pdf/7605safeguardedmicrod
atauserguideregandgrouplav10_tcm77-390387.pdf) 
4 The R2 values for similar models of British identity in each nation, by 
comparison, are much lower, lying between 0.1 and 0.15. 
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Table 1: British and sub-state national identification by ethno-religious group for adults aged 16+ in Scotland, England, Wales (2011 Census) 
 % identify as British  % identify as Scottish/English/Welsh 
 Scotland N England N Wales N Scotland N England N Wales N 
Ethno-religious group             
White British etc. 31 201,467 26 1,743,729 26 108,403 87 201,467 82 1,743,611 67 108,403 
White Irish 16 2,530 20 24,466 21 701 28 2,530 14 24,465 8 701 
White Other: Christian 8 4,140 11 68,841 8 1,686 15 4,140 6 68,839 5 1,686 
White Other: No religion 10 2,049 14 21,097 15 507 14 2,049 9 21,096 10 507 
Pakistani Muslim 54 1,518 68 34,095 63 347 43 1,518 15 34,087 19 347 
Bangladeshi Muslim 48 121 75 13,052 75 310 20 121 7 13,049 13 310 
Indian/Other Asian: Muslim 24 238 60 14,069 40 169 16 238 11 14,064 7 169 
(Black) African Muslim 28* 170 45 6,314 40 107 16 170 7 6,311 6 107 
Arab Muslim 33* 237 45 6,042 29* 279 24 237 8 6,042 5 279 
Indian/Other Asian: Hindu 24 645 59 31,880 40 451 15 645 10 31,870 6 451 
Indian/Other Asian: Sikh 48 314 67 14,541 64 103 41 314 16 14,538 12 103 
Chinese/Other Asian: Buddhist 30* 297 30 6,274 32* 181 15 297 6 6,273 2 181 
Chinese: No religion 30* 1,011 36 10,065 29* 409 18 1,011 8 10,065 7 409 
(Black) African Christian 23 740 44 24,913 22* 313 14 740 10 24,907 3 313 
(Black) Caribbean/ 
(Other) Black: Christian 
46 128 62 23,085 52 153 26** 128 28 23,078 18 153 
(Black) Caribbean/ 
(Other) Black: No religion 
37* 83 53 4,373 55 49 46** 83 41 4,371 37 49 
Any Asian or Arab Christian 36 707 42 18,898 39 603 27 707 11 18,894 7 603 
Mixed White/Black Caribbean - - 35 11,463 23* 372 - - 67 11,463 66* 372 
Mixed White/Black African - - 38 4,150 26* 132 - - 36 4,150 51 132 
Mixed White/Asian - - 47 8,742 46 308 - - 45 8,740 41 308 
Other Mixed - - 40 8,337 42 209 - - 35 8,333 41 209 
Mixed (All) 41 558 40 32,692 34 1,021 52 558 49 32,686 51 1,021 
 
Note: All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole per cent 
* not significantly different from White British etc. category at p < 0.05 
** not significantly different from the corresponding ethno-religious groups in England and Wales at p < 0.05 
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Table 2: logistic regression of English identification for adults aged 16+, England (2011 Census) 
 Odds ratio 95% C.I. for odds ratio N 
Ethno-religious group (White British etc.)  Lower Upper 1,743,729 
White Irish 0.100 0.096 0.104 24,466 
White Other 0.102 0.099 0.105 106,696 
Mixed White/Black Caribbean:  0.441 0.423 0.460 11,463 
Mixed White/Black African 0.262 0.243 0.282 4,150 
Mixed White/Asian 0.270 0.258 0.283 8,742 
Mixed Other 0.226 0.214 0.238 8,337 
Pakistani Muslim 0.072 0.070 0.075 34,095 
Bangladeshi Muslim 0.035 0.033 0.038 13,052 
Indian or Other Asian: Muslim 0.072 0.068 0.076 14,069 
Black African Muslim 0.078 0.071 0.087 6,314 
Arab Muslim 0.091 0.083 0.101 6,042 
Indian or Other Asian: Hindu 0.067 0.064 0.070 31,880 
Indian or Other Asian: Sikh 0.070 0.066 0.073 14,541 
Chinese or Other Asian: Buddhist 0.077 0.069 0.086 6,274 
Chinese: No religion 0.087 0.081 0.094 10,065 
Black African: Christian 0.086 0.082 0.090 24,913 
Any Asian or Arab: Christian 0.115 0.109 0.121 18,898 
Black Caribbean or Other Black: Christian 0.135 0.131 0.139 23,085 
Black Caribbean or Other Black: No religion 0.173 0.162 0.184 4,373 
Birthplace/Residence (Born England)    1,729,493 
Born Scotland 0.015 0.014 0.016 34,269 
Born N.Ireland 0.023 0.022 0.025 10,053 
Born Wales 0.028 0.027 0.029 23,998 
Not born UK, resident 70+ years 0.152 0.139 0.166 2,309 
Not born UK, resident 61-70 years 0.114 0.108 0.121 6,543 
Not born UK, resident 51-60 years 0.109 0.104 0.114 16,616 
Not born UK, resident 41-50 years 0.152 0.147 0.158 30,035 
Not born UK, resident 31-40 years 0.180 0.174 0.186 28,047 
Not born UK, resident 21-30 years 0.175 0.169 0.182 29,090 
Not born UK, resident 11-20 years 0.143 0.139 0.148 52,273 
Not born UK, resident 8-10 years 0.108 0.103 0.113 30,703 
Not born UK, resident 5-7 years 0.060 0.057 0.063 45,026 
Not born UK, resident 2-4 years 0.045 0.043 0.048 45,665 
Not born UK, resident < 2 years 0.038 0.035 0.040 30,880 
Social Class (Higher managerial/professional)    188,442 
Lower managerial/professional 1.156 1.140 1.173 455,277 
Intermediate 1.520 1.496 1.545 255,715 
Small employer or own account worker 1.626 1.597 1.656 197,371 
Lower supervisory and technical 1.857 1.821 1.893 156,242 
Semi-routine 1.897 1.866 1.928 302,183 
Routine 2.083 2.047 2.120 244,830 
Age 1.005 1.005 1.005 2,115,184 
 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.504 
For each categorical variable the reference category is shown in brackets after the variable name. e.g. 
Ethno-religious group (White British etc.). 
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Table 3: logistic regression of Welsh identification for adults aged 16+, Wales (2011 Census) 
 Odds ratio 95% C.I. for odds ratio N 
Lower Upper 
Ethno-religious group (White British etc.)    117,115 
White Irish 0.180 0.130 0.249 701 
White Other 0.232 0.186 0.291 2,493 
Mixed White/Black Caribbean:  1.007 0.737 1.377 372 
Mixed White/Black African 0.785 0.470 1.311 132 
Mixed White/Asian 0.516 0.369 0.720 308 
Mixed Other 0.401 0.273 0.591 209 
Pakistani Muslim 0.238 0.169 0.337 347 
Bangladeshi Muslim 0.130 0.086 0.195 310 
Indian or Other Asian: Muslim 0.397 0.204 0.775 169 
Black African Muslim 0.158 0.061 0.412 107 
Arab Muslim 0.165 0.083 0.326 279 
Indian or Other Asian: Hindu 0.181 0.112 0.292 450 
Indian or Other Asian: Sikh 0.102 0.050 0.211 103 
Chinese or Other Asian: Buddhist 0.052 0.017 0.157 181 
Chinese: No religion 0.161 0.100 0.259 409 
Black African: Christian 0.283 0.145 0.553 313 
Any Asian or Arab: Christian 0.227 0.153 0.338 603 
Black Caribbean or Other Black: Christian 0.290 0.168 0.499 153 
Black Caribbean or Other Black: No religion 0.326 0.152 0.700 49 
Birthplace/Residence (Born Wales)    86,602 
Born Scotland 0.011 0.009 0.014 1,139 
Born N.Ireland 0.018 0.013 0.025 396 
Born England 0.017 0.016 0.018 29,223 
Not born UK, resident 70+ years 0.070 0.041 0.120 76 
Not born UK, resident 61-70 years 0.028 0.019 0.043 239 
Not born UK, resident 51-60 years 0.038 0.028 0.051 455 
Not born UK, resident 41-50 years 0.054 0.042 0.069 575 
Not born UK, resident 31-40 years 0.073 0.058 0.091 586 
Not born UK, resident 21-30 years 0.066 0.052 0.083 590 
Not born UK, resident 11-20 years 0.041 0.032 0.052 917 
Not born UK, resident 8-10 years 0.025 0.016 0.037 654 
Not born UK, resident 5-7 years 0.017 0.012 0.025 1,128 
Not born UK, resident 2-4 years 0.006 0.003 0.011 1,199 
Not born UK, resident < 2 years 0.012 0.007 0.020 1,024 
Social Class (Higher managerial/professional)    8,547 
Lower managerial/professional 1.070 0.989 1.158 24,998 
Intermediate 1.115 1.023 1.215 13,583 
Small employer or own account worker 1.189 1.087 1.300 11,811 
Lower supervisory and technical 1.373 1.253 1.505 10,556 
Semi-routine 1.248 1.150 1.353 20,209 
Routine 1.505 1.383 1.639 16,415 
Welsh language proficiency (None)    95,995 
Can understand only 2.131 1.957 2.319 6,595 
Can speak, read and/or write 3.854 3.639 4.082 22,213 
Age 0.999 0.998 1.000 124,803 
 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.640 
For each categorical variable the reference category is shown in brackets after the variable name. e.g. 
Ethno-religious group (White British etc.). 
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Table 4: logistic regression of Scottish identification for adults aged 16+, Scotland (2011 Census)  
  Odds ratio 
95% C.I. for odds ratio N 
Lower  Upper 
Ethno-religious group (White British etc.)    201,442 
White Irish 0.189 0.168 0.214 2,530 
White Other 0.213 0.191 0.237 7,002 
Mixed 0.647 0.511 0.819 557 
Pakistani Muslim 0.342 0.298 0.392 1,518 
Bangladeshi Muslim 0.162 0.095 0.274 121 
Indian or Other Asian: Muslim 0.226 0.152 0.336 238 
African Muslim 0.305 0.198 0.471 170 
Arab Muslim 0.413 0.292 0.585 237 
Indian or Other Asian: Hindu 0.254 0.196 0.329 645 
Indian or Other Asian: Sikh 0.306 0.230 0.408 314 
Chinese or Other Asian: Buddhist 0.191 0.133 0.274 297 
Chinese: No religion 0.178 0.144 0.218 1,010 
African: Christian 0.236 0.186 0.300 740 
Any Asian or Arab: Christian 0.297 0.241 0.367 707 
Caribbean or Black: Christian 0.231 0.140 0.381 128 
Caribbean or Black: No religion 0.461 0.256 0.832 83 
Birthplace/Residence (Born Scotland)    178,227 
Born England 0.021 0.020 0.022 21,063 
Born Northern Ireland 0.015 0.013 0.018 1,762 
Born Wales 0.018 0.015 0.022 800 
Not born UK, resident 70+ years 0.130 0.097 0.174 207 
Not born UK, resident 61-70 years 0.155 0.123 0.194 384 
Not born UK, resident 51-60 years 0.107 0.090 0.127 684 
Not born UK, resident 41-50 years 0.119 0.104 0.137 1,042 
Not born UK, resident 31-40 years 0.122 0.106 0.140 1,132 
Not born UK, resident 21-30 years 0.093 0.080 0.107 1,053 
Not born UK, resident 11-20 years 0.076 0.068 0.086 1,877 
Not born UK, resident 8-10 years 0.055 0.046 0.065 1,103 
Not born UK, resident 5-7 years 0.040 0.035 0.046 2,807 
Not born UK, resident 2-4 years 0.026 0.023 0.030 3,167 
Not born UK, resident < 2 years 0.012 0.010 0.015 2,431 
Social Class (Higher managerial/prof.)    18,112 
Lower managerial/professional 1.212 1.143 1.286 43,540 
Intermediate 1.353 1.268 1.445 28,730 
Small employer or own account worker 1.245 1.156 1.340 16,218 
Lower supervisory and technical 1.434 1.330 1.546 18,139 
Semi-routine 1.655 1.551 1.765 34,321 
Routine 1.802 1.683 1.930 29,903 
Gaelic language proficiency (None)    213,931 
Can understand only 1.813 1.410 2.330 1,059 
Can speak, read and/or write 1.727 1.464 2.038 2,749 
Scots language proficiency (None)    132,180 
Can understand only 1.496 1.401 1.599 12,083 
Can speak, read and/or write 2.762 2.655 2.874 73,476 
Age 0.996 0.995 0.997 217,739 
 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.579 
For each categorical variable the reference category is shown in brackets after the variable name. e.g. 
Ethno-religious group (White British etc.). 
